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Ab s t ra c t  
Over the last two decades, New Zealand experienced a threefold increase in housing 
prices.  The largest surge in prices in recent years occurred between 1998 and 2007, a 
period of housing price growth in many developed economies.  Since 2007, housing 
price growth remained flat until 2011, and then prices once again embarked on an 
upward trend.  However, recent housing price growth has been concentrated in 
Auckland and Christchurch. The purpose of this report is to compare and contrast New 
Zealand housing trends and policies with those of United States. The report 
summarizes lessons learned from the United States and highlights data needs and 
research questions that may require further consideration in order to better understand 
housing markets in New Zealand.  
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Exe cu t i ve  Su m ma ry  
Main Findings 
Over the last two decades New Zealand (NZ) experienced a threefold increase in 
housing prices.  The largest surge in housing prices in recent years occurred between 
1998 and 2007, a period of housing price growth in many developed economies.  Since 
2007, housing price growth remained flat until 2011, and then prices once again 
embarked on an upward trend.  However, recent housing price growth has been 
concentrated in Auckland and Christchurch. 
The purpose of this report is to compare and contrast NZ housing trends and policies 
with those of United States (US).  The main findings of the report are summarized here: 
 
 Global forces, which were heavily influenced by US monetary policies and lending 
regimes, led to significant housing price increases in the US, NZ and many other 
countries during the 1998-2007 period.  Between 2008 and 2012, US housing prices 
tumbled in the housing market collapse, whereas NZ prices were flat during the 
same period. 
 Housing markets now appear to be recovering in the US, and prices in NZ are also 
trending upward.  However, the recent rise in prices in NZ is driven by the Auckland 
and Christchurch markets; housing prices elsewhere are stable. 
 Auckland housing pressure is partially the result of international in-migration and 
limitations in the ability of housing supply to quickly respond to demand.   
 Christchurch conditions are the result of housing supply problems resulting from 
the earthquakes in 2010 and 2011. 
 In the US, differences in regional housing price pressures are driven by population 
growth coupled with supply constraints due to terrain, bodies of water and land use 
regulations. 
 US cities that are more similar to Auckland (high amenities, growing populations and 
physical land constraints) experienced relatively high rates of housing price growth; 
even if Auckland’s housing supply could quickly match demand, population growth 
coupled with income-driven demand for amenities within a constrained land 
environment can result in rising land values and thus housing prices. 
 Appropriate responses to land value increases should be a combination of increased 
urban density and new development on the periphery.  However, in an effort to 
preserve quality of life for existing residents through their local governments often 
impose restrictive land use regulations, which constrain housing supply and thus 
exacerbate the housing affordability challenge. 
 
Potential Policy Solutions 
 
The report offers a discussion of several policy options, including a brief evaluation of 
the formation of the Auckland Super City, which is a substantial change in governance 
structure that may have significant implications for development in the coming years.  
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However, it is it too early to fully assess these changes.  Policy options center on better 
aligning the incentives of local authorities to regional and national housing needs.  
Options discussed include: 
 
 Introduce new incentives, subsidies and other policies at the local level to 
increase density and expand development from the urban center to the 
periphery. 
 Local governments can reduce the substantial uncertainty/risk borne by 
developers by cutting the length and variability in time to obtain regulatory 
consent.  In addition, both subnational and national governments could take on 
shares of the risks associated with the financing of infrastructure, particularly for 
larger development projects. 
 Increase the costs of holding undeveloped property for speculative purposes by 
implementing a land value tax at the local and/or national levels. 
 Use locally targeted capital requirements as determined by the Reserve Bank of 
NZ to temporarily take the heat off demand so as to enable supply to respond to 
long-run housing demand pressures. 
 Promote development in Auckland region satellite communities (matched with 
coherent transportation infrastructure planning) in order to relieve pressures on 
the Auckland core. 
 Strengthen other urban areas such as Christchurch so as to provide options to 
those who desire the benefits of living in highly urbanized areas. 
 
Data Needs and Suggestions for Further Research 
 
The report also identifies data needs and offers suggestions for further research that 
may help inform housing policy.  Information needs highlighted include: 
 
 While the regulatory environment can limit supply of new housing, little is known 
about the differences in regulations across NZ. The development of a NZ land 
use regulation index like that of Gyourko, et al. (2008) would improve our 
understanding of the policies that are in place and help to identify their impacts. 
 NZ cities such as Auckland and Wellington face binding geographic land 
constraints.  However, little is known about the degree to which physical land 
constraints have led to land/housing prices differences in these cities or 
elsewhere in NZ; a physical land constraint index similar to Saiz (2010) would be 
a valuable tool in this regard. 
 
Potential research projects identified include: 
 
 Estimate the impact of land use regulations and physical land constraints on 
housing price growth. 
 Estimate the impact of development contributions on various aspects of the NZ 
housing market. 
 Estimate the impact of moving from a land value tax to a general property tax in 
the Auckland region. When the Auckland Super City was formed, many 
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communities were forced to switch from a land value tax to a property value tax. 
This change provides an excellent opportunity to explore how local (and perhaps 
national) tax policy can be used to achieve land use/housing objectives. 
 Develop or modify a land use model to inform a development contribution 
subsidy framework. Such a model could help identify anticipated impacts of 
national infrastructure subsidies on housing demand/supply, affordable housing, 
and agglomeration economies. 
 Develop a regional econometric model of housing prices to identify housing 
bubbles and inform locally targeted capital requirements that could potentially be 
implemented by the Federal Reserve Bank of NZ 
 Study the impacts of the Christchurch earthquake in order to better understand 
the linkages (population and business flows, international student flows) between 
Christchurch and Auckland.  Evaluate strategies to strengthen Christchurch’s 
position in the NZ economy. 
 Explore options for altering the regulatory environment and the infrastructure 
funding framework to reduce the risk/uncertainty for developers.
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Housing Affordability:  Lessons from the 
United States 
I n t r od u c t i on  
Housing prices in New Zealand (NZ) have increased threefold over the last two 
decades, significantly more than the rise in general consumer prices.  Are housing 
price increases driven primarily by global trends that are outside the control of NZ 
policymakers?  Or are rising housing prices a result of internal economic 
conditions and policies? 
The purposes of this report are to summarize housing market conditions in NZ and 
draw comparisons and lessons from the United States (US) housing market 
experience.  As a prelude to the evaluation presented in this report, it appears that 
rising housing prices of the early to mid-2000s was due to larger global influences. 
The most recent jump in housing prices, however, appears to be caused by 
internal factors.  Further, the recent rise in housing prices is not truly nationwide;  
rather the regions of Auckland and Canterbury are the only areas experiencing 
significant housing price increases, and for different reasons.  In Auckland, rising 
housing prices appear to be the result of demand pressures driven in part by 
international in-migration.  The demand pressures coupled with restrictive land use 
regulations and emerging physical constraints on the availability of land is pushing 
prices up.  In Canterbury, housing price increases are the result of supply 
constraints caused by the Christchurch earthquakes in 2010 and 2011.
1
  According 
as recently published report by the New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation 
and Employment (2013), the total housing stock in Christchurch region decreased by 
11,500 housing units, or 6.2% of the housing stock. 
To provide some context for the housing market and policy comparisons, the next 
section offers a general description of the fiscal and regulatory environments of the 
two countries. Section 3 contains a more detailed summary of housing market 
conditions in New Zealand.  However, given that there are now numerous reports 
on the NZ housing market, this section is relatively brief; its purpose it to enable 
the reader to more easily make comparisons with the US housing market, which is 
embedded within the discussion.  Section 4 offers a policy discussion and lessons 
from the US experience that may inform NZ housing policy responses.  Section 5 
offers a discussion of nationwide considerations in relieving housing demand 
pressure in Auckland.  Finally, Section 6 offers a summary, outlining data needs 
and needed research. 
                                               
1
 It should be acknowledged that housing price increases in Auckland could potentially spread to 
the rest of the country as it did in the late 1990s through the mid-2000s.  The Productivity 
Commission’s Housing Affordability Inquiry (2012), pp. 30-31, illustrates housing price transmission 
from Auckland a few high growth tourism areas to the rest of the country that occurred during this 
period. 
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Ne w Ze a l a n d /Un i te d  S ta te s  F i sca l  a n d  
Re g u l a to r y  En v i ron me n ts  
In order to more fully understand the differences and similarities in the NZ and US 
housing markets, it is perhaps useful to briefly compare and contrast the national 
and sub-national fiscal and regulatory structures.  A brief summary of the fiscal 
features for the two countries is presented in Table 1 below.   
As shown in Table 1, while government expenditure as a percentage of GDP is 
substantially higher in NZ than the US, government is much more centralized in 
NZ.  In NZ, just nine percent of government spending as a proportion of GDP 
occurs at the local level, whereas in the US that number is about 13 percent.  
Further, intergovernmental transfers from the national to subnational governments 
are low in NZ, whereas in the US about 25 percent of subnational spending is 
funded by national government.
2
  Moreover, in the US both federal and state 
government transfers to local governments (townships, cities, counties and other 
local authorities) are significant:  More than a third of local revenue is derived from 
federal and state sources.
3
  Importantly, often times grant formulas are designed in 
such a way as to incentivize local authorities to engage in activities deemed 
important by higher levels of government.  Property taxes are a primary source of 
local government revenue in both the US and NZ; however, because the scope of 
local government responsibilities is greater in the US, the property tax burden is 
significantly higher in the US. 
 
Table 1: New Zealand and United States Fiscal Characteristics, 2012 
Fiscal Characteristic New Zealand United States 
Total Government Expenditures/GDP 44.5% 31% 
  National 35.4% 18% 
  Subnational 9.1% 13% 
National Government Debt/GDP 37% 148% 
Unfunded Liabilities per H/H $24,700 NZD
4
 $1,445,000 NZD 
Data Sources:  http://www.treasury.govt.nz/budget/2012/execsumm/06.htm; 
www.stats.govt.nz; http:/ /usadebtclock.com/ ; 
http:/ /www.census.gov/govs/local/ ; and http:/ /f inance.yahoo.com/blogs/the -
exchange/oh-way-government-totally-broke-222918359.html; and author's 
calculations. 
 
In the US, subnational governments are charged with providing a broad range of 
public services such as education, police and fire, local roads, parks and 
recreation, water and sewerage, health and human services, and economic 
development activity, including land use regulation.  In NZ, with exception of 
regional economic development, land use, sewer and water, local roads, and 
recreation, national government provides the other public services.  In the US, a 
decentralized governmental system is valued highly because this structure allows 
                                               
2
 See ht tp: / /www2.census.gov /gov s/local /summary_report .pdf .  
3
 Grant formulae vary greatly depending on purpose, type of government and across the states. 
4
 This calculation is based on New Zealand government debt plus unfunded liabilities for 
Superannuation.  This figure may not fully reflect total unfunded liabilities.   
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states/regions with different priorities and needs to develop localized government 
policies to meet these challenges.
5
  The decentralized governmental system in the 
US also enables state and local governments to experiment with policy options.  
These experiments generate both “successes” and “failures”, and we learn much 
from these experiences.  At the subnational government level, we have thousands 
of policy choices regarding land use regulations and development policies to 
examine, including the use of restrictive zoning, development contributions and 
other infrastructure funding methods, as well as urban growth boundaries.  At the 
national level, we can evaluate how national policies targeted at making 
mortgages accessible and at low interest rates resulted in an enormous housing 
bubble (but differentially affecting regions) between 2000 and 2008.  The goal of 
this report is to draw lessons from US experiences that may inform NZ’s current 
housing market challenges with regard to national housing policies and local land 
use regulations. 
Table 1 also shows that while NZ currently spends more on government as a 
proportion of GDP, its fiscal situation is much stronger than the US.  As can be 
seen from Table 1, government debt and unfunded liabilities in the US are 
substantial.  On a per household basis, debt and unfunded liabilities are 
$1,445,000 NZD and increasing.
6
  According to the work of Laurence Kotlikoff of 
Boston University, fully funding US liabilities would require an immediate increase 
in federal taxes of 57 percent to be continued indefinitely.  Thus, government 
spending as a proportion to GDP would have to increase to more than 41 percent 
in order to fully fund our long-run spending obligations.  While the long-term 
funding challenges for programs such as Social Security and Medicare (healthcare 
for the elderly) have been accumulating for many years, the meltdown of the 
housing and financial markets in the US exacerbated these challenges and has 
resulted in a substantial increase federal government deficit spending.  There are 
important policy lessons to be learned from the US housing market, in terms of 
both what to and what not to do. As is apparent from the US experience, the 
potential implications of such policy choices can be substantial.  
Turning our attention to issues more directly relevant to the housing market, in NZ 
there is a stronger relationship between national and subnational governments in 
determining land use regulations.  Generally, local authorities in NZ have 
significant economic development autonomy, but national government can and 
does intervene.  For example, in 2009 the national government via the Royal 
Commission on Governance assisted in the formation of the Auckland “Super City” 
wherein all local governments in the region were amalgamated into a single 
governing council.  The rationale for combining the local units was three-fold:  1) 
reduce unhealthy fragmented inter-jurisdictional competition; 2) promote a more 
coherent regional development pattern; and 3) improve community engagement.  
                                               
5
 In a large country such as the US, a decentralized governmental system allows autonomous state 
and local governments to develop policies that cater the specific needs, given economic and 
demographic conditions, and other factors.  NZ is a much smaller and more homogenous country; 
it is not clear that greater local government autonomy would result in more effective governmental 
structure. 
6
 State and local governments throughout the US also have significant unfunded liabilities that take 
the form of retiree compensation.  According to data on debt from the Census of Governments and 
information provided by Novy-Marx and Rauh (2010) and 
ht tp: / /www.kel logg.northwestern.edu/news_ar t ic les/2010/municipal -pension-
systems.aspx , state and local government debt and unfunded liabilities equal about $56,000 per 
US household. 
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While there are cases of region-wide local government cooperation in the US
7
, 
there is little direct national government intervention in regional development 
matters.
8
  State government authorities, however, have significant powers in 
organizing local governance; thus, there is significant variability across the states 
in regional governance and the structure of local institutions.  In some ways, it is 
perhaps more appropriate to compare and contrast NZ government structure and 
responsibilities with individual US states as opposed to the country as a whole. 
Ne w Ze a l a n d /Un i te d  S ta te s  Ho u s i n g  Ma rke t  a n d  
Ho u s i n g  Po l i c i e s  
With this general overview of the fiscal and regulatory environments in the two 
countries, consider now a summary of the evolution of the NZ housing market in 
recent years.  Embedded within this review are comparisons to the US experience.  
As illustrated in Figure 1, housing prices in NZ have increases substantially over 
the past twenty years.  However, most of the growth occurred between 2001 and 
2007, a period of worldwide increases in housing prices.
9
  Between 2008 and 
2011, housing prices were stable, but beginning in about 2011 prices in Auckland 
and Canterbury resumed an upward trend.  Interestingly, while rental prices have 
increased over time, rate of growth has been substantially below housing price 
increases.  Relative to income, the ratio of housing prices to household income 
increased from about three to one in the early 1990s to about five to one today. 
 
  
                                               
7
 The Minneapolis and St. Paul region in Minnesota is one such area that has been successful in 
developing cooperative regional development policies. 
8
 The Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution states: "The powers not delegated to the US by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.  However, federal government does offer public housing programs and offers development 
subsidies in targeted areas. 
9
 In fact, as shown in the a report by the New Zealand Productivity Commission (20012), real housing prices were relatively stable 
between 1970 and the early 2000s. 
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Figure 1: New Zealand Housing and Rental Prices 
    Panel A – Housing Price Index 
 
Panel B – Rental Price Index 
 
Source:  New Zealand Department of Treasury (2013). 
 
The Case-Shiller housing price index for the US is presented in Figure 2, showing 
a very similar ramping up of housing prices nationwide starting in the late 1990s, 
but then a precipitous drop beginning 2008.  Note, that real housing prices were 
quite stable dating back more than a hundred years.  That is, with the exception of 
the ramping up of housing prices during the recent massive bubble, prices in the 
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US roughly matched the increase in general prices as measured by the consumer 
price index, even during periods of significant population growth.
10
 
 
Figure 2: United States Housing Price Increases 
 
Source:  http://www.irrationalexuberance.com/index.htm  
 
Focusing more narrowly on the recent housing bubble period, Figure 3 
demonstrates that the ramp up in housing prices varied significantly from region to 
region.  Among the metropolitan regions shown in Figure 3, the Warren-Troy-
Farmington Hill metropolitan area (Michigan) experienced the slowest rate of 
housing price growth, whereas the Miami (Florida) metropolitan area experienced 
the most significant growth.  
                                               
10
 Note that while nationwide housing prices were stable until about 2001, there is considerable 
variation in housing price growth across regions. 
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Figure 3: United States Regional Housing Prices 
 
 
These regional differences are the result of a variety of factors, ranging from 
differences in population growth to supply restrictions, some of which will be 
discussed later in this report.  Note that the more recent ramping up of prices in 
NZ and the US coincide with one another, suggesting that global pressures (which 
are heavily influenced by US monetary policies and lending practices) affected 
housing prices in both countries.   
Over time, the quality of housing in NZ has improved considerably.  For example, 
as shown in Figure 4, the average size of a NZ new home increased by about 40 
percent since 1990.  Similarly, the average size of new homes in the US has also 
increased substantially over the years.  In addition, many older homes in NZ have 
undergone significant remodelling, and new standards for insulation and the like 
have been implemented over time.   
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Figure 4: New Dwelling Floor Area over Time 
 
 
Before describing the global housing price increase and the bursting of the bubble 
in the US, consider the more recent housing prices increase in NZ.  As shown in 
Figure 1, it appears that only the Auckland and Canterbury regions are 
experiencing housing price pressure.  If one removes these markets, the other 
New Zealand housing markets appear to be stable
11
.  Canterbury’s rising housing 
costs are the result of the 2010-2011 earthquakes and the challenges associated 
damaged housing stock and a slow recovery.  Auckland’s housing demand 
pressure, however, is driven by population growth and to some extent by 
international in-migration.  Since 2006, Auckland’s population grew by about 
118,000 people.  However, this growth is due to both the natural rate of population 
increase international in-migration, with the lion’s share of the increase due to due 
to natural population growth.  Yet, in-migration appears to play an important role in 
the Auckland housing market.  
Research by Coleman and Landon-Lane (2007), MacDonald (2013) and Stillman 
and Mare (2008) indicate that international in-migration increases housing prices.  
However, as shown in Figure 5, since 2003 permanent long-term net migration in 
the Auckland region has declined considerably in recent years.  This suggests that 
while international migration may place some pressure housing demand, it is not 
likely to be the primary driver in the coming years.  Note also that net migration in 
Canterbury was actually negative in the wake of the earthquakes.  
 
                                               
11
 As noted in the Productivity Commission Housing Affordability Report (2013), in the past rising 
prices in Auckland eventually spread to the rest of the country.  We should not exclude this 
possibility in the current context. 
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Figure 5: Net-migration in Auckland and Canterbury 
 
Source:  2012 Demographic Trends, Table 5.06, Statistics New Zealand:  
http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/population/estimates_and_projections/demographic-
trends-2012.aspx 
 
Another potential driver of housing price increases is rural to urban migration.  If 
there is a rapid transition from low value land in rural areas to higher value land in 
urban areas, one might expect a corresponding increase in the housing costs.  
However, as show in Table 2, there has been little change in the percent of 
population in rural vs. urban areas over the last 20 years. 
 
Table 2: Population Distribution by Urban Area, 1991-2006 Censuses 
Area of Residence 1991 1996 2001 2006 
 
Percent of Population 
Main Urban 69.6 70.2 71.0 71.8 
Secondary Urban 6.9 6.5 6.3 6.0 
Minor Urban 9.0 8.7 8.4 8.1 
Rural Centre 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.0 
Rural and Other 12.2 12.3 12.1 12.0 
New Zealand 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Data Source:  
http:/ /www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/populat ion/Migrat ion/internal -
migrat ion/urban-rural-migrat ion.aspx 
 
Figures 6 and 7 below show net migration across the US (Figure 6) and state 
housing price increases by state (Figure 7).
12
   
                                               
12
 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York offers geographic depiction of nationwide annual prices 
changes dating back to 2003. Click on http: / /www.newyorkfed.org/home-price- index/  to 
see the illustration. 
 1 0  
 
 
Figure 6: United States Net Migration by Region, 2000-2010
13
 
 
  
  
                                               
13
 In-migrants in the legend are per every 100 individuals. 
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Figure 7: United States Home Price Appreciation, 1998-2010 
 
Image from http:/ /designandgeography.com/2011/04/27/housing -price-index-
for-the-united-states-2000-2010/ 
 
Taken together, the maps show that the highest price increase areas, particularly 
during the period prior to the real estate crisis, are those that experienced net 
population inflows, though there are also other drivers of housing price trends.  
During 1998-2006, housing prices in the US grew at an unprecedented pace.  
While a few economists such as Robert Shiller had warned of a bubble prior to the 
crash beginning in 2007-2008, most did not recognize the risks until it was too 
late.
14
  Much has been written about the causes of the bubble and thus it is 
perhaps only useful to summarize and refer readers to other sources.
15
  Among 
the culprits are subprime mortgage lending, the opaque securitization process of 
mortgages, and government policies designed to promote affordable lending.  The 
presentation of the geographic distribution of US housing price growth offers 
motivation to more carefully consider local housing market conditions and the 
policies of local governments across the US. 
Re g i o na l  Ta rg e t i n g ,  La n d  Use  Co n s t ra i n t s  an d  
Urb a n  Eco n o mi cs  
What is also of interest are the linkages between nationwide policies such as the 
setting of interest rates, loan to value ratios, capital requirement, and other 
borrowing standards, and local/regional housing market trends and land use 
regulations.  In the US, the places that experienced the greatest run up in housing 
                                               
14
 See Shiller (2009) for a discussion of the real estate bubble and the bursting of the bubble in late 
2007. 
15
 See Follain and Giertz (2013) for an excellent overview of the causes of the US housing bubble.  
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prices are those that faced the most restrictive regulatory environments (Gyourko, 
et al., 2008; Huang and Tang, 2011).  However, it must be recognized that land 
use regulations are endogenously determined.  That is, high income places 
experiencing population pressure tend to adopt more restrictive regulations in an 
effort on the part of existing residents to retain their quality of life.  Nevertheless, 
the patterns are clear:  Land use restrictions tend to drive up housing prices; such 
regulations can delay and/or restrict what would be an appropriate housing supply 
response. 
In the US, where housing construction is on a much larger scale and tends to be 
more responsive to demand pressures, the construction industry overbuilt in 
response to rising prices resulting from the housing price bubble.  When the 
bubble burst in 2008, the US had a significant overstock of housing, which then 
exacerbated the housing price decline.  In addition, construction of new homes 
dropped from a peak of 1,280,000 in 2005 to 300,000 in 2011.
16
 Beginning in 
2012-2013, the US construction industry began to emerge and there is now some 
concern that there may be a shortage of workers; after being out of work for so 
long, many construction workers found employment in other industries.
17
 
In NZ, the smaller scale nature of firms within the construction industry reduces 
the likelihood of generating supply overhang like that experienced in the US.  On 
the other hand, smaller scale construction companies are not able to respond to 
rapid population growth such as is now being experienced in Auckland.  However, 
the small scale nature of New Zealand’s construction firms is not just a reflection 
of a smaller market.  Rather, small firms are also the result of the land regulatory 
environment.  That is, NZ construction firms tend to be small because land 
regulations are such that large scale land acquisition is difficult, and the approval 
process for large scale development is such that the time for obtaining approvals 
is lengthy and variable, and thus uncertain.  Further, large scale development 
often entails significant upfront infrastructure costs; significant delays due to 
various factors including local government approvals can result in significant 
financial stress and even bankruptcy.  This uncertainty coupled with significant 
upfront costs make it more difficult for small to medium sized construction 
companies to grow; this exposure may be prohibitive.  Basset, Malpass and Krupp 
(2013) also cite the importance of incentives in the development process and 
recommend change in infrastructure finance to better align the incentives of local 
government officials to be more responsive to housing pressure. 
With the Auckland’s recent consolidation of local authorities and subsequent 
revamping of land use regulations, it may be that the uncertainty due to 
unexpected delays in the development process will be reduced.  Time will tell.  
However, it may be prudent to reconsider the balance in the public-private 
partnership in funding and putting in place needed infrastructure, particularly for 
larger scale developments that seems necessary to match existing and anticipated 
demand in Auckland.  It may be that too much risk/uncertainty is borne by 
developers, and that achieving faster supply responses require that national and 
subnational governments take on a share in the risk.  Further, a shift to sharing in 
risks could better align the incentives of developers and local governments and 
therefore open the way for smaller construction firms to grow and/or merge to 
deliver the needed larger scale developments. 
                                               
16
 For historical data on new home sales, see 
ht tp: / /www.census.gov /construct ion/nrs/pdf /soldann.pdf .  
17
 See ht tp: / /jobs.aol .com/art icles/2013/05/10/construct ion - industry-shortage-
ski l led-workers/ .  
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There is a growing recognition in the US that nationwide central bank policies 
targeted at the housing market may be too blunt an instrument.  Smith and Weiher 
(2012), two economists from the US Federal Housing and Finance Agency, 
recently proposed a region-specific countercyclical capital buffer regime for 
residential mortgages.  A key assumption of their proposed approach is that 
regional housing prices have stable long-run trends and such trends can be 
identified.  If deviations from the trend can be identified, then central banks can 
impose capital requirements based on regional market conditions.  The work of 
Smith and Weiher (2102) and Follain and Sklarz (2005) suggests that it is possible 
to use econometric methods to identify regional housing price bubbles.
18
  To date, 
the US has not implemented locally based capital requirements, in part because 
there are substantial barriers to overcome in implementing such a strategy in such 
a large and diverse economy.  However, implementing locally based capital 
requirements in a smaller country such as NZ is potentially more feasible.   
In particular, given that Auckland is the only region experiencing rapidly rising 
housing prices driven by population growth, it may be prudent to consider a 
targeted response as opposed to a nationwide response.  In the context of recent 
actions by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, it may be unnecessary and costly to 
set the loan to value (LTV) requirement such that it requires a 20 percent deposit 
for the entire country.
19
  Instead, perhaps differential LTV requirements could be 
implemented regionally.  If policymakers desired to temporarily take the heat off 
housing market demand in Auckland in order to give supply an opportunity to 
catch up, one could implement higher a capital requirement and/or a higher LTV 
ratio in the Auckland region, and then gradually phase out the differential 
requirements proportional to the distance from the city core so as to minimize 
potential spatial distortions created by abrupt changes in requirements at 
jurisdictional borders.  Importantly, the central bank would have to make it clear to 
economic agents that the imposition of the regional capital requirement differential 
is not permanent and is intended to allow developers the time they need to 
respond to increasing long-run demand pressures. 
However, if housing demand pressure in Auckland is in part being driven by 
international in-migration, then one would also have to determine whether and 
where in-migrants get loans; increasing capital requirements and the LTV ratio in 
Auckland may not necessarily affect housing purchase decisions of immigrants.  In 
recent work, McDonald (2013) shows that an increase of 1000 international 
arrivals increases housing prices in Auckland by about 5 percent.  He also shows 
that reductions in departures of the same magnitude increase prices by about 2 
percent.  Further, the type of in-migrant also seems to matter; European arrivals of 
1000 have a 7 percent impact, but in-migrants from Asia and Oceania have much 
smaller effects.  McDonald (2013) suggests that the anticipated housing price 
effects due to international in-migration will be small because net migration in the 
future is likely to be the result of fewer departures and most new migrants are 
expected to come from Asia and Oceania.  Apparently, migrants from Asia and 
Oceania have very different housing preferences than do Europeans.  In addition, 
in-migrants from Europe are often New Zealanders returning to NZ and may be 
more likely to influence the housing market (Stillman and Mare, 2008). 
It is important to recognize that a growing and vibrant urban area will tend to 
experience increasing land values.  In fact, a positive price gradient and rising land 
values in a growing urban area is often a sign of a healthy regional economy.  It is 
                                               
18
 Follain and Giertz (2013) offer a more detailed discussion locally based capital requirements. 
19
 The New Zealand Reserve Bank recently imposed this requirement. 
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therefore critical to properly define “success” in the housing market, and this 
requires thinking about how prices should evolve in a dynamic, growing, land 
constrained region.  The target housing price increase in a high amenity land 
constrained environoment, even with an optimal supply response, is probably 
higher than the rate of increase in the general price level.
20
  The response to 
increasing land values should be higher density development in the core areas 
and increased development on the periphery.  However, local authorities often 
impose restrictive land use regulations that prevent high density development and 
increased development on the periphery.  A key issue is how to create incentives 
for local leaders to respond to market conditions quickly and efficiently.  
Importantly, aerial photographs and land use analysis suggest at Auckland may be 
approaching a physical land constraint as well; land is truly becoming scarce.  
While there is still opportunity (absent land use regulation restrictions) to increase 
density, it appears that green space is becoming more limited.   
There is also some tension that exists between the granting and protection of 
property rights and permissive land use regulations.  In some ways, a more 
permissive land use regime may enable denser redevelopment in core city areas, 
but there are potential negative net private benefits of development for existing 
residents.  The granting of permission to build on the urban periphery as well as 
redevelopment in urban core areas depends greatly on how property rights are 
defined.  As one extreme illustration, consider a 2005 US Supreme Court ruling on 
Kelo v. City of New London.  As it is in NZ, eminent domain provides an avenue 
for the seizing of private property for public purposes such as construction of a 
highway, provided the public entity justly compensates the owners for the taking.  
The Kelo v. City of New London provided a landmark ruling that justified public 
takings for the purpose of private development.  The court ruled that the City of 
New London could seize 90 acres of a blue collar neighborhood, condemn the 
property, and then extend a 99 year lease at a price of $1 to a developer who was 
to then to build an upscale development that included a waterfront hotel, office 
space and high end housing.
21
  In response to the ruling, there was a substantial 
citizen opposition not only in New London but throughout the entire country.  Prior 
to the ruling, seven US states specifically prohibited the use of eminent domain for 
economic development purposes.  By 2012, 37 other states enacted similar types 
of legislation that placed limits on the power of municipalities to invoke eminent 
domain for purposes of economic development.  The lesson is that intervention on 
the part of the public sector to alter a property rights regime to facilitate urban 
intensification can invoke substantial citizen opposition; care must be taken in 
revising property rights and land use rules. 
While comparisons of Auckland with growing urban areas in the US may be of 
use, some caution is warranted in the selection of comparable regions.  As one 
illustration, Bassett, et al. (2013) have looked to urban areas such as Houston, 
Texas where land use regulations are permissive and housing price growth 
modest.  While the features of the regulatory environment in Houston are certainly 
worthy of consideration, in general Houston and other Texas cities are dissimilar to 
Auckland.  Texas cities tend to be located in flat open spaces and thus have few 
physical impediments to growth; these regions have avoided housing price growth 
in part by growing out in a sprawling fashion.  Even if Auckland wanted to adopt a 
similar strategy, the nature of its physical environment prevents such an approach.  
                                               
20
 A high amenity land constrained environment in the presence of growing demand can lead to 
higher land/housing prices, particularly if the amenity-driven price response is high. 
21
 See ht tp: / /law2.umkc.edu/facul ty/projects/f t r ials/conlaw/takings.htm  for more 
details regarding this ruling. 
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If one looks to growing cities in the US that are more similar to Auckland in terms 
of natural amenities, terrain and bodies of water (such as San Diego, San 
Francisco, or Seattle), we see that these areas have also experienced rising 
housing costs. 
Several recent studies of US land and housing values may be of particular 
relevance for the current New Zealand situation.  The first is that of Gyourko, et al. 
(2008) who used information collected from a survey of local governments to 
create a land regulation index (the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory 
Index). They show that restrictive land use regulations are not necessarily present 
in places with higher population densities.  Rather, more restrictive environments 
are related to the desire of higher income households to preserve a low density 
quality of life.  This study also suggests that housing prices tend to be driven up by 
more restrictive regulatory environments. 
Saiz (2010) uses satellite-generated data on terrain elevation and the presence of 
water bodies to ascertain the amount of land available for development in urban 
areas around the US.  His research shows that regions most constrained by 
geography tend to have the most inelastic housing supply, and thus higher 
housing prices.  In the case of NZ, as population pressures mount the terrain and 
bodies of water (particularly in Auckland and Wellington) could very well generate 
inelastic housing supply. 
Albouy and Ehrlich (2012) estimate the relationship between urban land values 
and the price of residential housing.  Specifically, they use information from the 
American Community Survey to estimate housing price differentials across US 
metro areas.  They also use construction cost index data and construction wage 
data to estimate the determinants of housing costs.  Albouy and Ehrlich (2012) 
report that the average cost share of land is about one-third; however, the share 
varies from 10 to 50 percent from areas where land is cheap to where land is 
expensive.  They also find that housing costs increase when land use regulations 
and geographic constraints are significant.  In related work, Albouy (2009) shows 
that in many US urban areas the differential between undeveloped land and 
developed land on the fringe is about equal to the cost of converting agricultural 
land into development (i.e., the costs of infrastructure).   
Recent research on the Auckland housing market by Grimes and Laing (2009) and 
Zheng (2013) examined the land price differential between undeveloped land just 
outside Auckland’s metropolitan urban (MUL) limit and just inside the MUL.  His 
estimates show a substantial price differential:  Land just outside the MUL was up 
to nine times less valuable than land just inside the MUL. This finding provides 
evidence that Auckland’s MUL is a binding constraint and places pressure on land 
prices within the MUL.  Further, the MUL may be forcing a “leap frog” development 
pattern, where the MUL constraint results in a less coherent regional development 
pattern.
22
  
This evaluation suggests that the housing market, particularly in Auckland, is 
supply constrained.  What options are there for relaxing locally imposed land use 
regulations?  How can we better align the incentives of local authorities with the 
broader social gains associated relaxing the regulatory constraints, thus enabling 
a more rapid housing supply response?  Without such incentives individual 
communities may be averse to some types of new development, particularly if 
local officials are primarily concerned with maximizing the welfare of existing 
                                               
22
 The role that metropolitan urban limits play in development is complex.  See Grimes and Liang (2008) for a review of 
key literature on metropolitan urban limits.  
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residents within their own community.  In a broader sense, the size and density of 
an urban area should be determined by the balancing of marginal social benefits 
of development with the marginal social costs of development.  However, local 
authorities do not always have the incentives to consider development in a 
broader regional context.  What policy options are available to align local land use 
decisions with these broader regional and national considerations? 
The amalgamation of local councils in Auckland in 2010 provides a greater 
incentive to implement land use plans that meet the needs of the region as a 
whole. The amalgamation resulted in a number of significant changes, which 
among other things include the following: 
 
1) The 2010 inception of a single regional governance structure embodied in 
the Auckland Council. 
2) All communities transitioned to property value taxation (some communities 
had previously used land value taxation). 
3) A single system of development contributions (prior each community had 
their own individual policies). 
4) Streamlining of regulatory approval process, including the creation of 
Special Housing Areas (SHA) to speed the process of development. 
It is too early in the process to determine the degree to which these changes will 
improve housing supply responsiveness.  However, these changes appear to be in 
the right direction in that the single regional council will consider development 
patterns in a broader regional context as opposed to a more localized context.  
The changes in development contributions will reduce distortions in the sense that 
developers can potentially avoid fees by building in places with lower development 
contributions.  Further, a streamlining of the regulatory approval process may 
reduce the time required for developers to obtain the approvals they need.  On the 
negative side, many economists would have recommended that the Auckland 
region adopt land value taxes instead of property value taxes because land value 
taxes encourage the highest and best use of land and are more efficient than a 
property tax.
23
 
In NZ, local authorities are given permission to charge “development contributions” 
to help cover the public infrastructure costs of new construction.  A development 
contribution is paid for by the developer, who then typically embeds these costs 
into the price of the newly constructed home.  The work of Burge and Ihlanfeldt 
(2006a) in Florida suggests that such fees enable local authorities to more readily 
approve new development because such contributions offer a source of funding 
for the required infrastructure.  However, studies also show that these fees are 
fully passed on to home buyers in the form of higher prices (Delaney and Smith, 
1989).  Further, Burge and Ihlanfeldt (2006b) show that impact fees tend to 
discourage multi-family housing development.  Skidmore and Peddle (1998) study 
the effects of impact fees (or development contributions) across communities in 
the Chicago region (Illinois).  They find that the adoption of impact fees reduce the 
rate of residential development and property taxes.  Their findings demonstrate a 
significant shifting of the infrastructure finance from the community as whole to 
new home buyers.    In summary, while development contributions offer a needed 
source of infrastructure funding, they may also increase housing prices and reduce 
the construction of more affordable and dense development.   
One potential national government intervention that might help to align the 
incentives of local councils with broader regional housing needs and reduce the 
                                               
23
 See Dye and England (2010) for an excellent review of the theory and practice of land taxation. 
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risks borne by developers of large scale housing projects is to subsidize 
development contributions.  The subsidy could be designed in such a way as to: 1) 
Reduce or limit housing price growth; 2) encourage the development of dense 
multi-family housing; 3) better align the development incentives of local authorities 
with broader regional needs; 4) spread a portion of the risks of infrastructure 
investment currently borne by developers to local and national governments.  One 
would have to think carefully about the conditions for the subsidy, as policy 
interventions often result in unintended consequences.  With this important caveat, 
listed below are four factors to consider if such a subsidy were to be offered: 
 
Criteria A:  Set the subsidy rate to equal x percent of the development 
contribution, where x was set such that the marginal social benefits of 
development = marginal social costs of development.  In practice, it is 
difficult to determine “optimal” development and thus the optimal matching 
rate.  However, it may be possible to identify the positive/negative 
externalities associated with different types of development and then set the 
subsidy such that development patterns move in the direction of the 
optimal.  Note that it is entirely possible for the matching rate to be more 
than 100 percent, and resources could be made available to fund new 
infrastructure as well as needed infrastructure reinvestment. 
Criteria B:  Provide subsidies in regions where growth in housing demand 
exceeds growth in housing supply. 
Criteria C:  Offer a higher subsidy rate for more dense and/or affordable 
housing in urban core areas. 
Criteria D:  Allocations from national government could be recouped from 
the revenues generated from goods and services tax on the new housing. 
Criteria E:  The subsidies could be structured such that they offset the 
burden and risk borne by developers who are often asked to fund 
infrastructure for larger housing projects. 
Criteria F:  Offer a full subsidy rate in targeted zones and then reduce the 
subsidy rate in proportion to the distance from targeted zones.  The gradual 
reduction in the subsidy rate would help to reduce abrupt changes in the 
costs of development from one area to another.  
Oth e r  Op t i o n s  fo r  Ta k in g  th e  P re ssure  o f f  
Au ck la n d  
Strategies for taking the pressure off the Auckland housing market may require 
key investments elsewhere in the country.  Prior to the Canterbury earthquakes in 
2010, Christchurch was also experiencing significant population growth.
24
  
However, after the earthquake population growth slowed significantly, and the 
number of international students attending Canterbury University dropped 
precipitously.  Further, as illustrated in Figure 8 below, Canterbury net business 
growth has been negative in the period following the quake.  While there have 
                                               
24
 Given my background in the economics of natural disasters, I regret not be able to consider more 
fully the housing recovery challenge in Canterbury.  Professor Ilan Noy at the Victoria University 
Wellington is perhaps the world’s foremost expert on the economics of natural disasters and is an 
excellent resource. 
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been new business arrivals, these are likely related to construction.  What 
happens once the major construction is completed? 
Of the businesses that departed, where did they go and will they return as key 
infrastructure is rebuilt?  Will Canterbury once again emerge as a major attractor 
of talent from abroad?  Importantly, a thriving Christchurch can divert some of the 
housing pressure from Auckland.  One could argue that the country’s economic 
balance and regional growth trajectory (and thus the regional housing markets) will 
depend greatly on the Christchurch recovery.  Christchurch is arguably the only 
other metropolitan area that can compete with Auckland for international in-
migrants, and thus relieve some of the growth pressure in Auckland.  
 
Figure 8:  Business Migration into Canterbury 
 
Source:  PowerPoint Presentation by Ilan Noy (2013) 
 
As with other land-constrained growing regions, land values in Auckland will likely 
continue to rise. However, to relieve pressure on housing prices, New Zealand 
could consider the following strategies (primary government assignment in 
parentheses): 
 
1) Introduce incentives, subsidies and other policies designed to increase 
density and expand development at the urban periphery as discussed 
above and by others (local and national government). 
2) Use locally targeted capital requirements to temporarily take the heat off 
demand in order to give time for supply to respond to long-run housing 
demand pressures (Federal Reserve Bank of New Zealand). 
3) Promote development in Auckland region satellite communities (matched 
with coherent transportation infrastructure) in order to relieve pressures on 
the Auckland core (local and national government). 
4) Strengthen other urban areas such as Christchurch so as to provide options 
to those who desire the amenities associated with of living in highly 
urbanized areas (national government). 
 
[Type a quote from the document 
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5) Reduce the risk borne by developers by reducing uncertainty in the 
potentially lengthy and variable regulatory consent processes and by 
sharing in the risk associated with the financing of infrastructure for large 
development projects (local and national government) 
6) Increase the costs of holding undeveloped property for speculative 
purposes by implementing a land value tax (perhaps substituting a land 
value tax for the property value tax).  A land tax encourages the best and 
highest use of land, which means denser land use in core urban areas 
(local and national government). 
Su mma ry :   Da ta  Ne e d s ,  R e se arch  Qu e s t i o n s  
a nd  Re co mme n d a t i o n s  
While existing research shows that a number of factors influence the rate of 
housing price growth, a land-constrained growing region will likely continue to 
experience land value increases faster than the general rate of inflation.  The 
degree to which increasing land values translates to higher housing prices 
depends greatly on the degree to which land is constrained due to the physical 
environment, the initial conditions development (e.g., section sizes) and land use 
regulations (which are in part driven by the preferences of existing residents to 
retain their quality of life).  Further, it is unlikely that there is a single all-
encompassing solution to achieving affordable housing in NZ.  Rather, achieving 
affordability will require multiple strategies. Increasing land values and a steep 
urban land value gradient in Auckland is in part the result of its own success:  
People want to live in Auckland.  Increasing land values is not in and of itself a bad 
thing.  However, to the degree that the rate of housing price increase in Auckland 
is driven by regulation-induced supply constraints, it makes sense to consider 
policies targeted at alleviating such constraints. 
It should also be acknowledged that data needs and limited evaluation prevent us 
from fully understanding the nature of the housing price issue.  Listed below are 
several data needs and research questions that, if addressed, may help inform 
policies: 
 
1) Existing evidence suggests that land use regulations limit supply, and yet 
little is known about the differences in such regulations across the country. 
The development of a land use regulation index like that of Gyourko, et al. 
(2008) would improve our understanding of the policies in place and the 
effects of such policies on housing supply and prices. 
2) Some NZ cities such as Auckland and Wellington also face potential 
geographic constraints that limit land availability.  However, little is known 
about how these physical land constraints lead to land value differences 
and thus housing price differences.  The development of physical land 
constraint index similar to Saiz (2010) would be of value. 
Listed below are several research questions that if addressed may help to inform 
housing affordability policy responses: 
 
1) Estimate the impact of land use regulations and physical land constraints 
on housing price growth (should such indices be created for NZ). 
2) Estimate the impact of the imposition of development contributions on 
various aspects of the housing market in NZ (housing and land prices, 
development, affordable housing and density). 
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3) Estimate the impact on development of moving from a land value tax to a 
general property tax in the Auckland region. When the Auckland Super City 
was formed, many communities were forced to switch from a land value tax 
to a property value tax.  As highlighted earlier, many economists favor a 
land tax because it encourages more dense development in high land value 
areas, and is efficient in the sense that does not generate distortions or 
disincentives for development.  This exogenously imposed change in the 
local government fiscal environment provides an opportunity to see how 
local (and perhaps national) tax policy can be used to achieve land 
use/housing objectives. 
4) This report offers a general discussion of how an intergovernmental subsidy 
from the national government to local governments in the form of a 
development contribution matching grant could be implemented to better 
align the incentives of local authorities with broader regional development 
needs.  However, more work should be done to inform how such a subsidy 
could be devised.  The development of a land use model that would inform 
a potential development contribution subsidy framework could be of value in 
identifying anticipated impacts on housing supply and demand, availability 
of affordable housing and agglomeration economies. 
5) Develop a regional econometric model of housing prices to identify housing 
bubbles.
25
  Such a model would enable the implementation of locally 
targeted capital requirements for lending institutions in NZ.  Locally targeted 
capital requirements could temporarily take the heat off high-demand in 
markets such as Auckland and thus give house builders an opportunity 
meet long-run housing demand.  However, such an approach would have to 
be accompanied by clear messages from the central bank about long-term 
housing needs in the region so that builders will make decisions based on 
long-run expectations and not short-run policy actions such as local 
targeted capital requirements.  
6) Study the impact of the Christchurch earthquake in order to better 
understand the linkages (population and business flows, international 
student flows) between Christchurch and Auckland.  Evaluate strategies to 
strengthen Christchurch’s position in the NZ economy, thus offering an 
option to Auckland for those looking for an urban living experience. 
7) Explore ways to alter the local government regulatory environment and the 
infrastructure funding framework so as to reduce the risk/uncertainty for 
developers.  These factors may enable the emergence of larger 
construction firms to meet the significant supply needs in the rapidly 
growing Auckland region. 
 
While no single policy is likely to fully address the relatively high rates of housing 
price growth in Auckland, addressing the challenge across multiple dimensions 
could contribute to housing affordability now and in the future for all of NZ. 
                                               
25
 The work of Grimes, et al. (2009) could for the basis of such a model. 
 2 1  
 
Re fe re n ce s  
Albouy, David.  2009. “What Are Cities Worth? Land Rents, Local, Productivity and 
the Capitalization of Amenity Values.” NBER Working Paper No. 14918. 
Cambridge, MA. 
Albouy, David, and Gabriel Ehrlich.  2006.  Metropolitan Land Values and Housing 
Productivity,  NBER Working Paper.  Cambridge, MA.  
Bassett, Michael, Luke Malpass and Jason Krup.  2013.  Free to Build:  Restoring 
New Zealand’s Housing Affordability.  New Zealand Initiative Publication. 
Burge, Gregory and Keith Ihlanfeldt.  2006a.  Impact Fees and Single-family Home 
Construction. Journal of Urban Economics, 60 (2): 284-306, ISSN 0094-1190, 
http://dx.doi .org/10.1016/ j. jue.2006.03.002 . 
Burge, Gregory and Keith Ihlanfeldt.  2006b.  The Effects Of Impact Fees On 
Multifamily Housing Construction. Journal of Regional Science, 46: 5–23. doi: 
10.1111/j.0022-4146.2006.00431.x. 
Coleman, Andrew and John Landon-Lane.  2007.  Housing Markets and Migration 
in New Zealand, 1962-2006.  Discussion Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand. 
Delaney, Charles and Marc Smith.  1989. Impact Fees and the Price of New 
Housing: An Empirical Study. Real Estate Economics, 17: 41–54. doi: 
10.1111/1540-6229.00472. 
Doyle, Lisa and Ilan Noy.  (forthcoming).  The Short-run Nationwide 
Macroeconomic Effects of the Canterbury Earthquakes.  New England Economic 
Papers. 
Dye, Richard, and Richard England.  2010.  Assessing the Theory and Practice of 
Land Value Taxation.  Policy Focus Report. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. 
Follain, James. (forthcoming). The Search for Capital Adequacy in the Mortgage 
Market: A Case of Black Swan Blindness. The International Journal of Housing 
Markets and Analysis. 
Follain, James, and Seth Giertz.  2013.  Preventing  House Price Bubbles:  Lesson 
from 2006-20012 Bust.  Policy Focus Report, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. 
Arthur Grimes, Sean Hyland, Andrew Coleman, James Kerr, and Alex Collier. 2013.   
A New Zealand Regional Housing Model.  Working Paper 13_02, Motu Economic and 
Public Policy Research. 
Gyourko, Joseph, Albert Saiz and Anita Summers.  2008.  A New Measure of the 
Regulatory Environment for Housing Markets:  The Wharton Residential Land Use 
Regulatory Index. 
Huang, Haifang. and Yao Tang.  2011.  Residential Land Use Regulation and the 
US Housing Price Cycle between 200 and 2009.  Journal of Urban Economics 70 
(2-3):  320-46. 
Huffman, Forrest, Nelson, Arthur, Smith, Marc, and  Stegman, Michael.  1988.  
Who Bears the Burden of Development Impact Fees?  Journal of the American 
Planning Assocation, 54 (1):  49-55. 
Ihlanfeldt, Kieth and Timothy Shaughnessy. 2004. An Empirical Investigation of 
the Effects of Impact Fees on Housing and Land Markets, Regional Science and 
 2 2  
 
Urban Economics, 34 (6): 639-661, ISSN 0166-0462, 
http://dx.doi .org/10.1016/ j.regsciurbeco.2003.11.002 . 
Lucas, Robert E. Jr. 1988.  On the Mechanics of Economic Development", Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 22, pp. 3-42. 
McDonald, Chris.  2013.  Migration and the Housing Market.  Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand Analytical Note Series.  ISSN 2230-5505. 
New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2012.  Housing Affordability Inquiry. 
New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment.  2013.  Housing 
Pressure in Christchurch,New Zealand Department of Treasury.  2013.  Trends of 
Rents and House Prices in New Zealand: National and Regional Analysis, 
Treasury Report. 
Novy-Marx, Robert, and Joshua D. Rauh, “Public Pension Promises: How Big Are 
They and What Are They Worth?” Journal of Finance, 66(4), 1207-1245, 2011. 
Roback, Jennifer (1982) “Wages, Rents, and the Quality of Life.” Journal of 
Political Economy, 90, pp. 1257-1278. 
Saiz, Albert (2010) “The Geographic Determinants of Housing Supply” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 125, pp. 1253-1296. 
Schiller, Robert.   2009. Irrational Exuberance. Second Edition. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Singell, Lawrence and Jane Lillydahl.  1990.  "An Empirical Examination of 
the Effect of Impact Fees on the Housing Market." Land Economics, 66: 82-
92. 
Skidmore, Mark, and Peddle, Michael.  1998.  Do Development Impact Fees 
Reduce the Rate of Residential Development?  Growth and Change, 29: 383–400. 
doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2257.1998.tb00026.x.  
Smith, Scott, and Jesse Weiher.  2012. Countercyclical Capital Regime: A 
Proposed Design and Empirical Evaluation. FHFA Working Paper. 
http://www.fhfa.gov/webf iles/24538/countercycl icalcapitalregime122.p
df. 
Stillman, Steven, and David Mare.  2008.  Housing Markets and Migration:  
Evidence from New Zealand.  Motu Working Paper 08-06, Motu Economic and 
Public Policy Research. 
Taleb, Nassim N. 2007. The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. 
New York, NY: Random House. 
Zheung, Guanyu.  2013.  The Effect of Auckland’s Metropolitan Urban Limit on 
Land Prices. Research Note, Productivity Commission, Government of New 
Zealand. 
 
Working Papers in Public FinanceChair in Public Finance Victoria Business School
 About the Author 
 
 Mark Skidmore is Professor of Economics and Agricultural, Food, and Resource
Economics at Michigan State University, United States. 
Email: mskidmore@anr.msu.edu 
 
 
  
 
 
 
